What South Korea Understood About Infrastructure—and Mexico Is Still Debating

Editorial
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What South Korea Understood About Infrastructure—and What Mexico Is Still Debating (interAlcaldes Magazine)

South Korea turned roads, ports, energy, and connectivity into a development policy. Mexico has the resources and a historic industrial opportunity, but it must still guarantee continuity, evaluation, and local capacity.

For decades, Mexico has discussed infrastructure as a succession of projects: which highway to build, where to locate an airport, how much to invest in a railway, or which region should receive resources first. South Korea asked a different question: what productive system did it want to develop, and what infrastructure would make it possible?

The distinction is consequential. A public works project can be inaugurated and remain disconnected from the economy. A productive network, by contrast, links ports, roads, railways, energy, water, telecommunications, housing, technical education, and industrial cities under a shared territorial vision.

Mexico is no longer debating whether it should invest. The unresolved question is how it will select, connect, evaluate, and maintain its projects so they can endure beyond changes in government.

Infrastructure as a productive platform

From its first five-year plans, South Korea linked the expansion of its physical capacity to industrial and export objectives. The Seoul–Busan corridor, southeastern ports, manufacturing zones, power generation, and human-capital development were not treated as independent initiatives, but as components of a national strategy.

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Territorial plans gave continuity to that transformation and established priorities that extended beyond political calendars. After the Asian financial crisis, the country also strengthened its investment evaluation system. Since 1999, major public projects have been subject to preliminary feasibility studies coordinated by technical institutions such as the Korea Development Institute, along with cost controls and reassessment mechanisms.

The Korean model was neither linear nor perfect. It generated economic concentration, regional imbalances, environmental impacts, and projects with weak demand. Its decisive lesson was to build institutions capable of recognizing mistakes and correcting decisions.

“Infrastructure stops being merely a public works project when it begins operating as a platform for productivity.”

A contemporary sign of that systemic capacity can be found in logistics. In the World Bank’s 2023 Logistics Performance Index, based primarily on assessments collected in 2022, South Korea scored 3.8 out of five, compared with Mexico’s 2.9. The indicator covers infrastructure, customs, logistics services, traceability, and delivery reliability.

interAlcaldes Magazine: What South Korea Understood About Infrastructure—and What Mexico Is Still Debating

Mexico has projects but must build the network

Mexico does not lack investment or planning. Its 2026–2030 Infrastructure Investment Program for Development with Well-Being proposes MXN 5.6 trillion in public and blended investment across eight strategic sectors. The scale is significant and recognizes that growth requires energy, transportation, water, and connectivity.

The challenge begins when that portfolio must become a coherent network. A highway without last-mile connections, an industrial park without sufficient electricity, a port without rail access, or a city without adequate housing and mobility can generate construction activity without necessarily improving competitiveness.

The problem is already visible in industrial parks in northern Mexico, where businesses have identified insufficient water and electricity as barriers to growth, according to the World Bank. Less visible assets also shape development: an estimate cited by the OECD places water losses associated with leaks in distribution networks at approximately 46%.

The OECD argues that Mexico needs more systematic cost-benefit analysis, transparent prioritization, and stronger accountability throughout the investment cycle. Financing construction is not enough; operation, maintenance, and measurable results must also be secured.

Nearshoring’s municipal test

Industrial relocation does not occur in national speeches. It takes place in specific territories. A company evaluates whether it will find reliable energy, water, serviced land, security, digital connectivity, suppliers, qualified workers, and efficient routes to the border or maritime ports.

Municipal governments therefore become the interface between investment and the territory’s daily operation. Depending on local responsibilities and institutional arrangements, they oversee land use, permits, streets, mobility, waste management, and various urban services. Yet many municipalities lack the technical and financial resources to anticipate growth and coordinate effectively with state and federal authorities.

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This weakness can turn national investment into a local problem through congestion, unplanned urban expansion, pressure on water supplies, housing shortages, and declining public services.

“Nearshoring will not reach the municipality that promotes it the most, but the territory capable of sustaining it every day.”

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Continuity as a competitive advantage

Mexico must move from inventories of construction projects to regional productivity portfolios. This means organizing investments around economic corridors and territorial strengths; evaluating projects before, during, and after construction; securing maintenance funding; and strengthening the municipal capabilities needed to manage growth.

It also requires measuring more than budget execution or kilometers built. Meaningful evaluation should consider lower logistics costs, electricity reliability, water availability, commuting times, access to employment, the integration of local suppliers, and the quality of public services.

The objective is not to copy South Korea’s centralized model or overlook its social and environmental costs. It is to adapt its most relevant lesson: infrastructure requires institutional continuity, territorial coordination, and a verifiable relationship with productivity and well-being.

Mexico already recognizes the scale of the opportunity. It must now demonstrate that it can turn individual projects into national capacity that outlasts political calendars.

What would have to change for Mexico’s infrastructure to be evaluated by the productivity and well-being it generates, rather than simply by the size of the project being inaugurated?